Lebanese Shi'ites Prefer State Control Of Arms

New polling data released in mid-October suggests that Hezbollah faces increasing scrutiny from the Shi'ite community that has traditionally formed the backbone of its support base. The findings, reported by Israel's public broadcaster KAN and the Lebanese outlet Kataeb.org, indicate a significant portion of the population favors state control over the group's military assets.

The data comes from a survey conducted in September by Statistics Lebanon, which polled 800 Lebanese Shi'ites. The results show that 66.4% of respondents support handing Hezbollah's weapons over to the Lebanese state. In contrast, 29.6% expressed a desire for the group to retain its arsenal. This stands in contrast to Hezbollah's long-held argument that its weapons are essential for defending Lebanon against Israel.

Further details reported by Kataeb.org highlight a strong preference for centralized state authority. According to the site, 71.1% of those surveyed believe that decisions regarding war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese government. Only 5.9% indicated that Hezbollah's leadership should play a larger role in shaping the country's future direction.

Trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces appears robust among the surveyed population. Approximately 78.5% of respondents stated they trust the army, and 51.1% identified it as the institution best positioned to ensure long-term security. By comparison, only 16.5% selected Hezbollah for that role. These figures challenge the group's traditional claim to be the primary guardian of Shi'ite security interests.

Despite the shift toward state preference, sentiment toward Hezbollah remains complex. A majority of 67.4% said the group had either failed or only partially met its goals in the recent conflict with Israel. Additionally, 42.1% expressed disappointment, anger, or concern about the leadership and the aftermath of the war. Nevertheless, 59.5% still reported some level of trust in the organization, with 37.1% citing a great deal of trust.

Roi Kais of KAN noted that Hezbollah's strength is sustained by the support networks and status it provides to the sect, assuming no other entity fills the void. This dynamic is particularly relevant given an earlier survey by Lebanon's Information International in May 2026. That study found 87.5% of Shi'ite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah, with only 7.9% in favor. Researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni, writing for the Institute for National Security Studies, suggested that differences in wording or agenda may account for the divergent results.

Mizrahi and Levanoni argued that the group's influence is rooted in social and economic networks, political power, and the historical marginalization of Shi'ites. They also pointed to intimidation as a factor that discourages dissent. In their view, weakening Hezbollah requires a stronger army and financial support from Western and Gulf states to help the government replace the services the group currently provides.

Local wariness of the group is also evident. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly opposed the opening of a branch of the Hezbollah-linked financial institution Al-Qard Al-Hassan in their building, fearing it might become a target in an Israeli strike. Such branches have been hit in the past. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has announced aid of up to $14,000 for eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs whose primary homes were destroyed, and up to $12,000 for those elsewhere.

Hezbollah has suffered significant military and leadership losses, including the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. A new conflict in March 2026 caused heavy destruction in southern Lebanese villages. Whether current discontent translates into political change may depend on whether the state can provide security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity.